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   nnovation Research IAbstract 
The European Commission is currently reviewing two major policy instruments 
which will pose major economic challenges and opportunities for EU power pro-
ducers. First, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is likely to 
include a high percentage of auctioning. Second, support schemes for electricity 
from renewable energy sources may involve open private-actor trade of guaran-
tees of origins (GO). This paper provides a first coarse comparison of the im-
pacts of these policy changes on power sector producer rents. The results sug-
gest that the losses in producer rents from increased auctioning in the EU ETS 
may be offset by additional producer rents from private-actor based GO trade 
for renewable electricity. 
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Introduction and Objective* 
Following the spring 2007 decisions of the Council of the European Union
1 
there are two important policy proposals currently under development by the 
European Commission (EC) which pose vital challenges for power producers in 
the EU: 
First, to help achieving the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction tar-
get of 20% (30%) in the year 2020 (compared to 1990 levels) the EC is cur-
rently reviewing the EU core climate policy measure, the European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). One of the likely outcomes of the review is a 
significant increase in the share of allowances that companies covered by the 
EU ETS have to purchase in the third phase of the EU ETS starting in 2013. 
While the share of allowances that Member States may auction off in the sec-
ond phase (2008-2012) is limited to 10 percent, the EC intends to increase the 
auctioning share to two-thirds for the third phase.
2 Among other things, auction-
ing will address “windfall profits”, in particular for power producers. Because 
power demand is fairly inelastic and competition from outside the EU is weak, 
power producers manage to pass on a large share of the additional costs asso-
ciated with GHG emissions (i.e. the price of allowances) to customers. If allow-
ances are allocated for free, extra profits (producer rents, often termed “windfall 
profits”) accrue. Independent of whether allowances are allocated for free or 
auctioned off, power producers not covered by the EU ETS such as nuclear, 
small fossil and - depending on the support scheme in place - also renewable 
power plants also enjoy additional producer rents from higher power prices. 
Second, the EC is currently preparing a renewable energy Directive to provide 
further clarification and assistance on the achievement of 20% renewable ener-
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1  Council of the European Union, 7224/1/07, REV 1. 
2   PointCarbon (12 December 2007) cites Jos Delbeke, a senior official within the EC, DG 
Environment as follows: “We estimate that two-thirds of the allowances, approximately, will 
be auctioned”.  2  Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables: 
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energy targets for individual Member States as well as accompanying policy 
measures will be proposed. In particular, this will involve the introduction of a 
flexibility mechanism to better match, in particular, renewable electricity (RES-
E) potentials to Member State targets, while striving for a cost-effective exploita-
tion of RES-E at the European level in the future.
3 Most likely, these targets will 
be based on a flat rate approach, which includes the same percentage point 
increase for each country and a modulation by the level of a Member State’s 
GDP. A prominent proposal
4 involves trade of Guarantees of Origin (GO) on a 
private level to increase the Member States flexibility in reaching their targets 
both domestically and via imports from other countries.5 While trading of GO 
may result in cost-efficient RES-E deployments, it may also generate significant 
producer rents. Unless there are technology-specific GOs a uniform European 
GO price for all RES-E options would be set based on the marginal cost of the 
most expensive technology (marginal producer) necessary to meet the aggre-
gate target for RES-E deployment in the EU. Producer rents accrue for all re-
newable electricity generators with generation costs below those of the marginal 
producer.
6 
Figure 1 illustrates generically the possible producer rents (surplus) arising from 
such a technology-neutral support scheme for producers of renewable electric-
ity. The violet line reflects a cost-resource curve of the additional realisable po-
tential for renewable electricity. The whole basket of available RE technologies 
is clustered into several bands, indicated by their (long run) marginal generation 
cost and the corresponding realisable future potential. Low-cost options such as 
biowaste incineration, biomass co-firing or most preferable sites for wind on-
shore are on the left part of the merit order curve, followed by moderate RES-E 
options – e.g. wind onshore at moderate sites, wind offshore, small-scale hy-
                                            
3   The paper focuses on RES-E and abstracts from effects that may arise if large-scale re-
newable heat would also be included in such a trading scheme. 
4 Ecofys  (2007). 
5   An alternative to GO-trade on private level is GO-trade on Member State level, which is 
favoured by several renewable energy associations and different Member States. This pro-
posal would have significantly different effects compared to a proposal based on private 
trade. In particular, a large increase in producer profits for renewable generators would not 
appear in a scenario where only Member States were allowed to trade, and where the tra-
de involved the surpluses or deficits of RES-E targets, while national RES-E support 
schemes remained undistorted. 
6   For these (and other) reasons the UK government is currently considering technology ban-
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dropower or large-scale biomass plants. On the margin with regard to the re-
quired additional RES-E deployment up to 2020 are large-scale agricultural bio-
gas and medium-range biomass plants. Consequently, a mandatory technol-
ogy-neutral GO trading scheme is expected to result in significant producer 
rents, which are shown in Figure 1 as the violet area above the cost-resource 
curve. 
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The purpose of this paper is to offer a first tentative assessment and compari-
son for the net impact of these two pending policy proposals on the producer 
rents
7 of power producers in the European Union (EU-25).  
 
7   Gross of corporate income taxes etc.  4  Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables: 
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Methodology and Results 
We start with calculating the changes in producer rents for different auctioning 
shares within the ETS based on the following assumptions: 
•  The (implied) allocation budget for the power sector will be 25 % lower than 
projected CO2-emissions for the third phase of the EU ETS, which is as-
sumed to last from 2013 to 2017.
8 Allocation for the fourth phase (2018-2022) 
will be 30% lower than projected emissions. For the second phase (2008-
2012), the budget is assumed to be 20 % lower.
9  
•  The power sector will have to purchase allowances for 75 % of its implied 
allocation budget in the third phase, and 100 % in the fourth phase.
10 As a 
benchmark, we use an auctioning share of 5 % for the second phase.
11 
•  The future price for EU allowances (EUAs) is 25 €/t for the second, third and 
fourth phase (expressed in 2005 €).
12  
•  The “pass-through rate”, which reflects the extent to which the additional 
costs of carbon result in an increase in the power price, is 80 %.
13 
                                            
8   We assume that the trading periods continue to last for five years. However, the next pe-
riod may also be longer and last for eight years until 2020.  
9   These are very rough estimates, based on the following. a) The need to achieve the EU 
emission reduction target for 2020: the implied reduction efforts are in line with differences 
between the baseline scenario and the efficiency scenario in Mantzos et al. (2006), but ad-
justed to achieve the 20% reduction target in 2020. b) The need for the power sector to re-
duce disproportionably for cost-efficiency reasons. c) Implied reduction efforts for the sec-
ond phase of 16% compared to projected emissions for all installations covered by EU ETS 
(see Schleich et al. (2007)). d) Since emissions projections are based on estimated emis-
sions for the power sector (thermal power plants) in Mantzos et al. (2006), they also in-
clude emissions from installations not covered by the EU ETS, such as power installations 
with a capacity of less than 20 MWth.  
10   Of course, these figures are somewhat arbitrary, but nevertheless in the range of the likely 
outcomes. According to the EC, a very high percentage of auctioning is planned for the 
power and energy sectors (PointCarbon from 12 December 2007 citing Jos Delbeke, a 
senior official within the EC, DG Environment).  
11  In phase two only about 3-4% of allowances will be auctioned off or sold on the secondary 
market. However, the power sector is assumed to have contributed more than in proportion 
to the auctioning budgets through a tighter allocation of free allowances. 
12   If banking between phases is allowed, prices for EUAs should be about equal in absence 
of any unexpected demand or supply shocks. A price of 25 €/t is in line with the current fu-
ture price for 2012. 
13  This figure is in line with estimates for pass through rates in EU MS presented in Sijm et al. 
(2006).  Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables:  
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Based on these assumptions the impact of the auctioning of emission allowances 
has been estimated. The producer rents captured through auctioning are shown 
as the blue line in Figure 2 (all monetary values are expressed in 2005 €). 
To calculate the producer rents for a European wide mandatory and private-
party based trading scheme for renewable guarantees of origin (GO) we as-
sume the following: 
•  "Export restrictions (by Member States) of GOs will be limited to a minimum" 
as stated in the paper by Ecofys (2007). In this case, profit-maximizing RES-
E generators will aim for the highest support level offered in any of the Mem-
ber States. This will put pressure on current support schemes to align. Even-
tually, technology-differentiated support schemes will be replaced by a uni-
form EU-wide trading system (Ecofys, 2007, p. iv). For our calculations, such 
a uniform price for tradable GOs was allowed to emerge endogenously from 
2010 on for all new RES-E deployment. For each year, this price reflects the 
cost of the marginal RES-E option to meet the linearly interpolated annual 
aggregated RES-E target for all EU-25 MS. 
•  The majority of future investments will be made by corporate European po-
wer companies. This assumption can be justified from the experiences in 
countries, which base their support system on tradable green certificates, 
where large corporate investors turned out to be better suited to deal with 
higher investor risks (Mitchell et al. 2006).  
•  Although arguable, no risk premium (reflecting investor’s risk under a trading 




14   Based on the experience with trading systems in the UK, risk-premiums would increase 
prices for RES-E. 6  Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables: 
A comparison of the impact on power sector producer rents 
Producer rents resulting from mandatory private-actor based GO trade are cal-
culated by the Green-X model, which contains a detailed representation of costs 
and potentials for renewable energy sources in the EU Member States
15. In par-
ticular two scenarios were calculated for this analysis: 
•  Scenario I: In order to reflect the effect of mandatory private-actor based GO 
trade a harmonised non-technology-specific support of renewable electricity 
was modelled, which leads to one uniform price of GOs all over Europe (see 
above).  
•  Scenario II: The second case represents a cost-reflective support for renew-
able electricity as currently implemented or planned in the vast majority of EU 
Member States.
16.To reduce producer rents, these systems include technol-
ogy-specific feed-in-tariffs with step-wise rates mimicking the cost-reductions 
for individual technologies over time. 
The derived results comprise the transfer payments arising from the applied RE 
policy schemes, defined as the direct financial transfer from the consumer to the 
RE producer In a last step the additional producer profits occurring in the case 
of an unlimited private actor based trade policy have been calculated by sub-
tracting the transfer payments occurring in both scenarios I and II. The result of 
this calculation is also portrayed in Figure 2 as the orange line (expressed in 
2005 €). 
                                            
15    For details on the Green-X model and assumptions used in these calculations see 
www.green-x.at and www.optres.fhg.de. The assumptions on the future development of e-
lectricity demands and energy prices in these calculations are based on the energy effi-
ciency scenario in Mantzos et al. (2006): “European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030” 
- update 2006. 
16   In particular all feed-in or premium systems offering differentiated tariffs for individual (clus-
ters of) RES-E technologies as well as the planned banding in the UK ROCs system repre-
sent such technology-specific support schemes. Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables:  
A comparison of the impact on power sector producer rents  7 
 
Figure 2:   Impact of captured producer rents via auctioning under the 
EU ETS and additional producer rents arising from technol-
ogy-neutral RES-E support as compared to technology spe-
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Conclusions 
The results derived in this paper suggest that captured producer rents due to 
auctioning of EUAs under the EU ETS and new producer rents due to certifi-
cate-based renewable energy trading are of similar quantitative order of magni-
tude.  
Thus, from a purely distributional perspective, the introduction of a private-actor 
based GO trade for renewable electricity may largely offset the reduced pro-
ducer rents in the European power sector due to auctioning increasing shares 
of CO2-emission allowances.  8  Increased auctioning in the EU ETS and trade in guarantees of origin for renewables: 
A comparison of the impact on power sector producer rents 
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